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I. INTRODUCTION
Over fifteen years ago in Green v. Champion Insurance Co.,'
the Louisiana's First Circuit Court of Appeal introduced a
controversial form of piercing the corporate veil called "single
business enterprise" or "SBE" theory. Traditionally, veil-piercing
has been used sparingly in Louisiana and only in cases where
either fraud or misuse of the corporate form has taken place. In
Green, the first circuit employed an un-weighted eighteen factor
test that focused primarily on control rather than fraud or misuse of
the corporate form to find that a group of affiliated businesses was
a single business enterprise. Recently, the second circuit in Town
of Haynesville, Inc. v. Entergy Corp. overturned a trial court
decision that used Green's SBE theory in a contract dispute to
impute the actions of one electric utility subsidiary onto another.
This decision is important for two reasons. First, the second circuit
should be praised for refusing to drastically expand veil-piercing
jurisprudence through broad application of SBE theory and
rejecting its use in the contract interpretation arena. Second,
language in the court's opinion could and should be applied more
broadly to reject any application of SBE theory where there is no
showing of fraud or misuse of the corporate form.
SBE theory, as established by the first circuit in Green, ignores
traditional veil-piercing jurisprudence and allows Louisiana courts
to disregard corporate separateness based solely on a finding that
one company is controlled by another. Application of this theory
would allow courts to disregard the corporate entity every time it
found a type of relationship exemplified by the classic parent-
subsidiary arrangement. 3 Furthermore, the eighteen factor test
offered by the first circuit for applying SBE theory is not only
methodologically unworkable, but also represents an extremely
poor policy choice for this state. Lastly, broad application of SBE
theory to legitimate multiple-entity business structures could
seriously weaken the firmly established practice in Louisiana of
Copyright 2009, by JAMES T. DUNNE, JR.
1. 577 So. 2d 249 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1991).
2. (Haynesville 11) 956 So. 2d 192 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 964 So.
2d 334 (La. 2007).
3. GLENN G. MORRIS, SINGLE BUSINESS ENTERPRISE BACKGROUND
MEMORANDUM-REPORT OF THE LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE TO THE
LOUISIANA STATE LEGISLATURE IN RESPONSE TO HOUSE CONCURRENT
RESOLUTION NO. 138 OF THE 2001 REGULAR SESSION 1 (Nov. 29, 2004).
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respecting the separate legal identity of businesses and the
legislative grant of limited liability to corporations and limited
liability companies. This in turn could have detrimental effects on
Louisiana's ability to encourage business development in this state.
In an important opinion, the second circuit in Haynesville4
recognized these dangers and overturned a trial court decision that
applied SBE theory in a contract interpretation setting. More
specifically, the second circuit refused to allow the plaintiff to use
SBE theory to effectively re-write the contract and impute the
actions of one affiliated subsidiary to another in order to trigger a
most-favored-nation-clause. 5 Though the court clearly rejected the
use of SBE theory in the arena of contract interpretation, it is
arguable that language in the decision went even further and calls
into question any use of SBE theory where there is no showing of
fraud or misuse of the corporate form. Therefore, the Haynesville
decision may represent the beginning of the rejection of SBE
theory and its reliance on control alone to disregard corporate form
by Louisiana courts. If this is the case, then the second circuit
should be praised for interjecting some much needed restraint into
SBE jurisprudence.
Part II of this Case Note briefly explores the origins of SBE
theory and the eighteen factor test established by the first circuit in
Green v. Champion Insurance Co.,6 and then discusses the many
criticisms of SBE offered by various commentators. Part III
examines the facts and procedural history of the second circuit case
Town of Haynesville v. Entergy Corp. and then argues that the
court is not only rejecting the expansion of SBE theory, but calling
into question any application of SBE that relies solely on the factor
of control to disregard corporate form.
II. THE ORIGINS OF SBE THEORY IN LOUISIANA AND ITS
DETRIMENTAL EFFECTS ON BUSINESS POLICY
In Green v. Champion Insurance Co.8 the first circuit introduced
SBE theory, a radical new form of veil-piercing that allows
Louisiana courts to disregard certain aspects of corporate identity
4. Haynesville I, 956 So. 2d 192.
5. See generally id (referring to the "most-favored-nation-clause," which is
defined by Black's Law Dictionary as "1. A clause in an agreement between two
nations providing that each will treat the other as well as it treats any other nation
that is given preferential treatment. 2. By extension, such a clause in any contract,
esp. an oil-and-gas contract." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1035 (8th ed. 2004)).
6. 577 So. 2d249.
7. 956 So. 2d 192.
8. 577 So. 2d249.
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that have traditionally been afforded to affiliated business groups.
In its most simple form, traditional veil-piercing is used to
disregard the corporate form and impose liability for corporate or
LLC obligations vertically onto the assets of an entity's
shareholders, be they human or juridical. 9 The effect of SBE
theory, on the other hand, is to pierce the veil of all businesses in
an affiliated group---"upstream, downstream, and sideways ' ' l -
effectively removing all corporate distinctions, and to treat the
group as one unified entity subject to the debts of any one of the
separate affiliates."
SBE theory and the eighteen factor test established in Green
represent a considerable expansion of traditional veil-piercing
jurisprudence because it does not require a finding of fraud or
misuse of the corporate form to extinguish a business entity's
limited liability protection. Despite the Louisiana courts' treatment
of traditional veil-piercing as a radical remedy 12 available only
under exceptional and limited circumstances, 13 the first circuit in
Green established a rule that would eliminate limited liability
between the majority of parent and subsidiary companies based
solely on the fact that one company controls the other.' 4 This
radical new approach to veil-piercing is both a deeply flawed legal
framework and a poor policy choice for this state. First, in practical
application, the un-weighted eighteen factor test is highly
unworkable and allows for widely disparate results. Second, SBE
theory poses a significant risk to a core tenet of Louisiana business
law: respecting the legal separateness and limited liability
protection afforded by the corporate form.
A. Green v. Champion Insurance Co. and the Origins of SBE
In Green, the Commissioner of Insurance brought suit against
an insolvent insurance company, its parent corporation, and other
affiliated entities in its business group. The Commissioner, relying
on considerable evidence of fraud and the absence of adherence to
9. See generally GLENN G. MORRIS & WENDELL H. HOLMES, BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS § 32, in 8 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 50 (1999).
10. MORRIS, supra note 3, at 7.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 2. (citing Amoco Prod. Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 838 So. 2d 821, 833
(La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 845 So. 2d 1096 (2003)).
13. Id. (citing Riggins v. Dixie Shoring Co., Inc., 590 So. 2d 1164 (La.
1911); F.G. Bruschweiler (Antiques) Ltd. v. GBA Great Britain Antiques, LLC,
860 So. 2d 644 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2003); Shoemaker v. Giacalone, 793 So. 2d
230 (La. App. 2d Cir.),.writ denied, 804 So. 2d 632 (2001)).
14. Id. at 3.
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even basic corporate formalities amongst the business group,' 5
alleged that the affiliated entities had been operated as a "single
business enterprise." The first circuit agreed with the
commissioner and applied an un-weighted eighteen factor test to
determine that Champion was an SBE. The first circuit then
directed the entire group's assets to be pooled and used to satisfy
outstanding policy holder claims of Champion.
B. Criticism of Single Business Enterprise Theory and the Eighteen
Factor Test
SBE theory and the eighteen factor test have received
considerable criticism as both a flawed legal framework and a poor
policy choice for this state.
1. SBE: A Flawed Legal Framework
In establishing SBE theory, the first circuit reasoned that:
the legal fiction of a distinct corporate entity may be
disregarded when a corporation is so organized and
controlled as to make it merely an instrumentality or
15. Champion Insurance was a subsidiary of Boardwalk International, Inc.,
which owned a number of other closely held corporations. John M. Eicher, Jr.
owned 84% of the stock of Boardwalk, Eicher and members of his immediate
family were the controlling shareholders of all of the nine corporate entities that
made up the Boardwalk group, and they all acted as overlapping directors and
officers of the various corporations. Most of the entities were operated out of the
same office, and all of the entities shared the same accountant. Lastly,
Champion Insurance had no employees of record. Green v. Champion Ins. Co.,
577 So. 2d 249, 251-53 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1991).
The Court also found:
[t]here was a tremendous amount of intercompany debt due to the lack of
adequate capitalization .... Substantial intercompany debt was created
to enable other corporations or individuals to use the assets of one
corporation to make purchases or invest in one of the other corporations.
Cash would leave one corporation and flow through a series of other
corporations or individuals within a short period of time thereby creating
assets or capital on the books of those involved. These funds would
ultimately be returned to the initial corporation in the lending cycle.
Corporate formalities were not observed with respect to annual
shareholder meetings, formal board meetings, and corporate
authorization for major transactions .... Activities between members of
the group were not properly reflected on the books of these corporations.
Documentation of many of these transfers was inadequate .... Costs for
the construction of a shareholder's home were buried in Champion books
as part of the cost of constructing Champion's office building.
Id. at 257-59.
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adjunct of another corporation. If one corporation is wholly
under the control of another, the fact that it is a separate
entity does not relieve the latter from liability.'
6
The first circuit stated that courts should look to the substance
of the corporate structure rather than its form and enumerated
eighteen factors to use when determining if a business group is in
fact an SBE.
17
Even ignoring the inherent impracticality of consistently
applying any un-weighted eighteen factor test, the Green test has
received substantial criticism as a flawed legal framework. The
two main criticisms of the test are that a large number of the
factors are readily found in almost any parent-subsidiary or closely
affiliated business relationship 8 and that a number of the listed
factors appear to contradict one another.' 
9
a. Factors Present in Nearly All Parent-Subsidiary Structures
If courts follow the test laid out by the first circuit, then most
affiliated business entities would be "guilty" of a large number of
the factors. The first factor, ownership of stock sufficient to give
"working control" over an entity, favors piercing anytime a single
16. Id. at 257 (citing Lucey Mfg. Corp. v. Oil City Iron Works, 131 So. 57
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1930)).
17. These 18 factors include: (1) corporations with identity or substantial
identity of ownership, that is, ownership of sufficient stock to give actual
working control; (2) common directors or officers; (3) unified administrative
control of corporations whose business functions are similar or supplementary;
(4) directors and officers of one corporation act independently in the interest of
that corporation; (5) corporation financing another corporation; (6) inadequate
capitalization ("thin incorporation"); (7) corporation causing the incorporation
of another affiliated corporation; (8) corporation paying the salaries and other
expenses or losses of another corporation; (9) receiving no business other than
that given to it by its affiliated corporations; (10) corporation using the property
of another corporation as its own; (11) noncompliance with corporate
formalities; (12) common employees; (13) services rendered by the employees
of one corporation on behalf of another corporation; (14) common offices; (15)
centralized accounting; (16) undocumented transfers of funds between
corporations; (17) unclear allocation of profits and losses between corporations;
and (18) excessive fragmentation of a single enterprise into separate
corporations. Lastly, the court explained that the list is merely illustrative and is
not an exhaustive list of all relevant factors. Id. at 257-58.
18. Kyle M. Bacon, Comment, The Single Business Enterprise Theory of
Louisiana's First Circuit: An Erroneous Application of Traditional Veil-
Piercing, 63 LA. L. REV. 75, 86 (2002).
19. Daniel Q. Posin, Turning Green: Louisiana's Piercing-the-Corporate-
Veil Jurisprudence and Its Economic Effects, 79 TUL. L. REV. 311, 359 n.312,
362 (2004).
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shareholder holds more than 51% of outstanding stock, a situation
found between most parent corporations and wholly owned
subsidiaries. 20 This is also true of the fifth and seventh factors;
most parent corporations cause the incorporation of the
subsidia1 2' and likewise finance them.22 Additionally, many
multiple entity businesses, in an effort to either take advantage of
economic efficiencies or to ensure adequate control, have common
employees (Factor 12), officers, and directors (Factor 2); share
offices (Factor 14); and have some form of centralized accounting
(Factor 15).23 These practices have legitimate economic benefits
and do not alone suggest any misuse of the corporate form.
b. Inconsistent Factors
A number of the factors also seem to contradict one another.
For instance, the first circuit correctly identifies inadequate
capitalization or "thin incorporation" as a valid factor in a veil-
piercing analysis. Inexplicably, the court then goes on to penalize a
parent corporation for: "[one] corporation financing another,"
"[one] corporation paying the salaries and other expenses or losses
of another corporation," and "services rendered by the employees
of one corporation on behalf of another corporation.' 24 All of these
practices are perfectly legitimate examples of a parent corporation
making capital contributions to a subsidiary. Furthermore, these
contributions also directly contradict a claim of
undercapitalization.
26
2. SBE: A Poor Policy Choice for Louisiana
Broad application of SBE theory by Louisiana courts could
lead to the erosion of the protection of limited liability and be
20. Id. at 359 n.307. Perhaps even less than 51% if the remaining stock
ownership is highly fragmented.
21. This is the case unless the subsidiary is bought by the parent. But this
fact clearly should not offer any more guarantee of limited liability than the
formation of a subsidiary. Id. at 360 n.313.
22. Id. at 360 n.314.
23. Id. at 361 n.321.
24. Id. at 359-61.
25. Although the paid in capital requirement was eliminated in Louisiana in
1969, it is still obviously contemplated that a parent corporation will contribute
capital contributions in the manner of cash and services to a wholly owned
subsidiary. GLENN G. MORRIS & WENDELL H. HOLMES, BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS § 8.26, in 7 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 309 (2d ed. 2001)
(citing 1928 La. Acts No. 250, §§ 3, 8; 1950 La. Acts No. 202, §1).
26. See Posin, supra note 19, at 359-61 nn.307-24.
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damaging to business interests and economic development in this
state. By failing to require a showing of fraud or misuse of the
corporate form, SBE theory: (1) largely ignores the cautious body
of jurisprudence surrounding traditional veil-piercing and
undermines a core tenet of Louisiana business law; (2) ignores the
myriad of legitimate reasons for a multiple-entity corporate form;
(3) increases the cost of doing business; (4) discourages the
investment of capital; (5) fails to consider the adverse and
unintended effects on creditors; and (6) creates havoc with
contractual relations.
a. SBE Theory Ignores Traditional Veil-Piercing
Jurisprudence
SBE theory, as established by the first circuit, is a striking
departure from traditional veil-piercing jurisprudence in that it
lacks any mention of fraud or misuse of the corporate structure.
27
The Louisiana Supreme Court in Riggins v. Dixie Shoring Co.
directly addressed a court's right to revoke a business entity's grant
of limited liability and found that one of the primary components
of piercing is to "prevent the use of the corporate form [to] defraud
.. . creditors." 28 Where "the plaintiffs do not allege shareholder
fraud, they bear a heavy burden of proving that the shareholders
disregarded the corporate entity to such an extent that it ceased to
become distinguishable from themselves." 29  In Glazer v.
Commission on Ethics for Public Employees, the Court
summarized its viewpoint:
If any general rule can be laid down in the present state of
authority, it is that a corporation will be looked upon as a
legal entity as a general rule, and until sufficient reason to
the contrary appears; but, when the notion of legal entity is
used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect
fraud, or defend crime, the law will regard the corporation
as an association of persons.30
27. Not only does SBE theory ignore this body of jurisprudence, it arguably
does so unnecessarily. Traditional veil-piercing, with a few minor alterations,
seems perfectly capable of handling cases where courts applied SBE theory. See
generally Bacon, supra note 18.
28. 590 So. 2d 1164, 1169 (La. 1992).
29. Id. at 1168 (citing Chaney v. Godfrey, 535 So. 2d 918, 921 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1988); Am. Bank of Welch v. Smith Aviation, Inc. 433 So. 2d 750, 755 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1983)).
30. 431 So. 2d 752, 758 (La. 1983) (quoting United States v. Milwaukee
Refrig. Transit Co., 142 F. 247, 255 (E.D. Wis. 1905)).
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By removing fraud or misuse of the corporate form from the
analysis, SBE theory is then left to be triggered by the mere factor
of control. 31 This too, directly conflicts with traditional veil-
piercing analysis. As LSU Law Center's Vice Chancellor Morris
stated in a Report of the Louisiana State Law Institute, "[p]roof of
control alone, no matter how complete, is not enough to impose
veil piercing liability under traditional law." 32 Furthermore, the
U.S. Supreme Court has recognized this principle and stated
unequivocally:
Thus it is hornbook law that "the exercise of the 'control'
which stock ownership gives to the stockholders . . . will
not create liability beyond the assets of the subsidiary. That
'control' includes the election of directors, the making of
by-laws ... and the doing of all other acts incident to the
legal status of stockholders. Nor will a duplication of some
or all of the directors or executive officers be fatal. 33
Under Louisiana's traditional veil-piercing jurisprudence,
control is necessary but not sufficient to impose liability.34 The two
main tests established by the jurisprudence require showing that
either a corporation was the mere alter ego of its controlling
shareholder and had engaged in some type of fraud, or that
corporate formalities were so ignored as to make the shareholder
and the corporation indistinguishable. 35 Clearly, the eighteen factor
31. In Miller v. Entergy Services, Inc., the fourth circuit, relying on Green,
stated:
If one corporation is wholly controlled by another, the fact that it is a
separate entity does not relieve the latter from liability. In that situation,
the former corporation is considered to be the alter ego or business
conduit of the latter. Courts can pierce the veil of a corporation in order
to reach the 'alter egos' of the corporate defendant.
913 So. 2d 143, 148 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2005) (citing Green v. Champion Ins.
Co., 577 So. 2d 249, 257 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 580 So. 2d 668 (La.
1991)).
32. MORRIS, supra note 3, at 3.
33. United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 61-62 (1998) (citation omitted).
34. MORRIS, supra note 3, at 3 n.14.
35. Id. (citing Riggins v. Dixie Shoring Co., Inc., 590 So. 2d 1164, 1168
(La. 1991); Amoco Prod. Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 838 So. 2d 821, 833 (La. App. 3d
Cir.), writ denied, 845 So. 2d 1096 (La. 2003)). Recent cases say that, in the
absence of fraud, the plaintiff bears a "heavy burden" of proving
indistinguishability. See, e.g., F.G. Bruschweiler (Antiques) Ltd. v. GBA Great
Britain Antiques, LLC, 860 So. 2d 644, 651 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2003). The courts
also consider the following five factors either independently or, more
commonly, as part of the alter ego or indistinguishability analysis: (1)
commingling of corporate and personal funds; (2) observance of statutory
formalities in the incorporation and operation of the company; (3)
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test, which makes no mention of fraud or misuse of the corporate
form, is in direct conflict with this parallel jurisprudence.
The rationale for relaxing the standard for courts to revoke the
protection of limited liability in SBE cases is based perhaps on the
misguided notion that since only capital contributions (the assets of
the affiliated businesses) are being imperiled, then the restraint
shown in traditional veil piercing cases (where the ultimate human
shareholders' assets are liquidated) is unneeded.36 This is in direct
contravention of the Louisiana Supreme Court's stated policy of
respecting the limited liability of parent corporations on equal
terms as that of a human shareholder. 37
The law has long been clear that a corporation is a legal
entity distinct from its shareholders and the shareholders of
a corporation ... shall not be personally liable for any debt
or liability of the corporation. The same principle applies
where one corporation wholly owns another.
38
Thus, some courts are subjecting wholly-owned affiliates to a
theory they have soundly rejected between wholly-owned
corporations and a human shareholder. 3
9
This cavalier attitude towards the revocation of the protection
of limited liability, where capital assets are given less protection
than those of a human shareholder, is unsound.4 ° Major public
corporations are responsible for the vast majority of investment
capital that the grant of limited liability is supposed to encourage
and have just as much reason as an individual human shareholder
41to avoid risking all of their capital on a new venture.
Furthermore, granting greater protection to capital assets does
not necessarily protect the human shareholder from significant
harm. 42 First, sole shareholders of small businesses will often leave
the majority of the profits in the various businesses themselves.43
Second, many of those businesses are commonly held in multiple
undercapitalization; (4) whether a separate bank account and financial records
have been maintained; and (5) whether regular director and shareholder
meetings have been held. Id. (citations omitted).
36. MORRIS, supra note 3, at 7-8.
37. See Bujol v. Entergy Servs., Inc., 922 So. 2d 1113 (La. 2004).
38. Id. at 1127-28 (citations omitted).
39. MORRIS, supra note 3, at 5.
40. See id. at 5-6.
41. Id. at 6.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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corporations or LLCs to minimize risk.44 Thus, the entrepreneur
who creates a new business entity before re-investing capital to
open a second gas station or restaurant will be severely impacted if
those capital assets are pooled and liquidated under SBE theory.
b. SBE Theory Ignores the Myriad of Legitimate Reasons for a
Multiple-Entity Corporate Structure
The privilege of limited liability is granted to corporations by
the legislature in order to encourage development and capital
investment.4 5 The multiple entity business group allows businesses
to organize and separate their operations by location, function, or
degree of risk to minimize exposure or to insulate a particular pool
of assets from a risky new line of business.46 SBE theory, with its
emphasis on control, ignores these legitimate business goals and
punishes businesses for taking advantage of the very benefits the
legislature intended to confer upon them. Thus, as SBE theory
places the protection of limited liability in jeopardy, it disregards
the legislature's intent and threatens to "turn Louisiana's
traditional limited liability regime on its head.,
47
c. SBE Theory Discourages the Investment of Capital and
Increases the Cost of Doing Business
If the SBE doctrine set forth in Green allows Louisiana courts
to disregard the multiple-entity business structures that are
accepted throughout the rest of the United States,48 corporations
may think twice before investing in Louisiana business
opportunities. 49 In Bujol v. Entergy Services, Inc., the Louisiana
Supreme Court explicitly recognized the roll of limited liability in
the investment of capital, noting that "[tihe fundamental purpose of
the corporate form is to promote capital by enabling investors to
make capital contributions to corporations while insulating
separate corporate and personal asset[s] from the risks inherent in
44. Id.
45. Bacon, supra note 18, at 104 (citation omitted).
46. Id. at 104-05 (citation omitted).
47. MORRIS, supra note 3, at 4.
48. Id. at 4 (citing United.States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 61 (1998)
(citation omitted) ("It is a general principle of corporate law deeply 'ingrained in
our economic and legal systems' that a parent corporation (so-called because of
control through ownership of another corporation's stock) is not liable for the
debts of its subsidiaries.")).
49. Id. at 6.
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business."50 Separating a riskier line of business in a separate
corporation is a common and accepted business practice. A
multiple entity structure allows for the protection of the core
business's assets while insulating it from the higher insurance
premiums and financing costs that occur in ventures with a higher
degree of liability or risk.5' If the protection of limited liability
cannot be maintained by establishing a separate entity, then
businesses will be forced to either forego undertaking new
ventures or will have to unnecessarily suffer increases in the cost
of doing business. 52 Both of these alternatives could negatively
impact business development in this state.
d. SBE Theory Can Produce Adverse and Unintended Effects
for Creditors
The effect of SBE theory is to pierce the veil of all businesses
in an affiliated group--"upstream, downstream, and sideways '53-
effectively removing all corporate distinctions and to treat the
group as one unified entity subject to the debts of any one of the
separate affiliates. 54 In cases where the blended SBE company is
able to pay a piercing judgment and remain solvent, the effect of
SBE on other creditors is nil.55 While the controlling shareholder
of the blended company will see the equity of the combined
companies reduced by the amount of the judgment, the creditors of
the individual companies will not be harmed as the value of their
claims will remain unchanged. 56 But, where the piercing judgment
exceeds the equity of the blended group, the interests of unsecured
creditors of the individual businesses will be directly affected.57
Thus, creditors of the weaker pierced entity are allowed to recover
their debts at the exR ense of unsecured creditors of the stronger
entities in the group. Where the legislature has provided for such
50. 922 So. 2d 1113, 1128 (La. 2004) (citations omitted).
51. MORRIS & HOLMES, supra note 9, § 32.15, at 98-99.
52. See MORRIS, supra note 3, at 7 n.19 ("Even if an entrepreneur is willing
to live with this increased risk of liability, his lenders and insurers may not be-
at least not at the same interest rates or insurance premiums. If they cannot loan
money or insure risks in separate companies separately, they will have to charge
rates for the risks they incur as if they were lending or insuring the entire SBE-
blended group of companies.").
53. Id. at 7.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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an outcome,59 this result may be justified, but where no explicit
expression of public policy is present, courts should be particularly
careful about the effects SBE theory can have on unrelated creditors.
e. SBE Theory Poses a Serious Threat to Contractual
Relationships
As with traditional veil-piercing, the dissolution of corporate
separateness and revocation of the protection of limited liability is
particularly contentious in the contractual setting. It is black letter
contract law that when two parties enter into an agreement, they
are bound by the terms of that agreement. The application of SBE
theory alters this bedrock principle in two distinct ways. First, SBE
theory may allow a party suing for contractual damages to enforce
a judgment against the assets of an affiliated entity even without a
contractual guarantee by that entity. Second, in arguably the most
controversial application of SBE theory to date, a plaintiff may
seek to use SBE to change the agreed upon contractual obligations
themselves. It is this attempted radical application of SBE theory
that was at issue in the second circuit case Town of Haynesville v.
Entergy Corp. and is the subject of this Case Note.
The general rule in traditional veil-piercing cases is that:
Where a creditor has agreed to look only to the assets of the
corporation for his payment, that agreement will be
enforced unless, in some rough sense, the creditor should
not be expected to understand the nature of his agreement,
or the corporate shareholder has either committed fraud or
violated the implied contractual obligation of good faith.6 °
The removal of the requirement of fraud or misuse of the
corporate form allows plaintiffs to use SBE theory to obtain an un-
bargained for benefit equivalent to a windfall. Particularly in cases
between sophisticated parties who were represented by counsel,
one party should not be able to use SBE theory to judicially re-
write a contract to include an un-bargained for guarantee by a
parent or affiliated corporation. Unlike the innocent tort victim
who is unable to bargain for a guarantee, 61 parties who willingly
enter into a contract should face a higher hurdle when attempting
59. See MORRIS & HOLMES, supra note 9, § 32.15, at 99. Bankruptcy law
also provides for the rare but similar outcome through the doctrine of
substantive consolidation. Id.
60. Id. § 32.06, at 71.
61. Even in a tort situation, courts have been unwilling to pierce the
corporate veil without extraordinary circumstances. See generally MORRIS &
HOLMES, supra note 9, §32, at 50-101.
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to pierce the corporate veil. Justice Dennis's concurring opinion in
the denial of rehearing in Riggins v. Dixie Shoring Co. made clear
that:
Where the action underlying the request to pierce the
corporate veil is based on contract, courts have usually
applied more stringent standards to piercing the corporate
veil . . . . Accordingly, absent very compelling equitable
considerations, courts should not rewrite contracts or
disturb the allocation of risk the parties have themselves
established.62
Finally, the use of SBE theory to retroactively alter agreed
upon terms in a contract is a notion that most business lawyers
would find repugnant. Businesses commonly use the multiple
entity form to legitimately separate obligations and pools of
assets. Application of SBE theory in these cases would allow one
party to impute the performance and obligations of a contract with
another party to all of the entities affiliated with that party. This is
the equivalent of negotiating as part of a purchase price a specific
percentage of the profits of a business and then later demanding
that the buyer include in the calculation profits from all other
businesses the buyer controls. This is basically using SBE not to
satisfy a debt, but to change the value or nature of the debt itself.
As outlandish as this may seem, the imputation of the obligations
of one business onto its affiliate are the underlying facts of the
second circuit decision in Town of Haynesville v. Entergy Corp.
III. TowN OF HAYNESVILLE V. ENTERGY CORPORATION
The second circuit in Haynesville overturned a trial court
decision that had greatly expanded the application of SBE theory
into the realm of contract interpretation. This case is particularly
interesting for SBE jurisprudence, as it involves an extremely
expansive application of SBE theory against a defendant that is
highly regulated by both state and federal authorities. Arising out
of a franchise fee dispute between a municipality and a utility
company, the case presented the issue of whether the town was
entitled to a higher fee, as per the terms of a most favored nation
clause, due to the actions of a separate subsidiary of the
defendant's affiliated group. More specifically, did Entergy
Louisiana have to pay the Town of Haynesville the same higher
62. 592 So. 2d 1282, 1285 (La. 1992) (citation omitted).
63. MORRIs & HOLMES, supra note 9, § 32.05, at 69.
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rates that Entergy Gulf South, a separate incorporated company,
paid to some towns in Texas?
Although the town did not allege fraud or misuse of the
corporate form, the trial court found in favor of the municipality
and declared that defendant Entergy Corporation was a single
business enterprise. While the second circuit originally denied
Entergy's motion for summary judgment on the SBE issue, it
correctly overturned the trial court on appeal and refused to extend
SBE theory into dangerous new territory.
This section will begin by examining the factual and
procedural history of Haynesville, including the second circuit's
denial of Entergy's motion for summary judgment. It will then
analyze the second circuit's opinion on appeal and discuss the
extent of the opinion's ramifications on the use of SBE theory by
Louisiana courts.
A. Facts and Procedural History
Although the underlying facts of the case appear relatively
clear, the procedural history is a bit more complicated. In January
of 1985, Louisiana Power and Light Company (LP&L), later
known as Entergy Louisiana (ELI), entered into a twenty-five
year franchise agreement with the Town of Haynesville. 65 In
exchange for the exclusive right to provide the Town electric
service, LP&L agreed to pay a 2% franchise fee of its gross
income derived from the franchise.66 The parties additionally
entered into a side letter agreement which contained a most
favored nation clause. 67 The clause provided:
As part and portion of the consideration for the franchise
renewal contract granted by the Town of Haynesville to
Louisiana Power and Light Company (the "Company")...
the Company does hereby further agree, that in the event
the Company contracts with any other town or municipality
in the renewal of its franchise contracts to pay as a franchise
fee more than two (2%) percent of the gross receipts of the
Company from the sale of electric service.. . the Company
will increase the franchise fee more than two (2%) percent
of gross receipts of the Company from the sale of electric
64. For simplicity's sake, the author will use the current name Entergy
Louisiana (ELI).
65. Town of Haynesville, Inc. v. Entergy Corp. (Haynesville 11), 956 So. 2d
192, 194 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 964 So. 2d 334 (La. 2007).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 195.
[Vol. 69
2009] NOTE 705
service ... [and] the Company will increase the franchise
fee paid to the Town of Haynesville.
68
In 1949, Middle South Utilities, Inc. (MSU) was formed as a
public utility holding company under the Public Utility Holding
69Company Act of 1935 (PUHCA). In its role as holding company,
MSU owned 100% of the stock in four subsidiaries: Arkansas
Power and Light Company, Mississippi Power and Light
Company, Louisiana Power and Light Company, and New Orleans
68. Id. at 194.
69. Id. The PUHCA was passed in 1935 as a direct response to the overly
complex and confusing structure of public utility holding companies. Amy
ABEL, CRS REPORT-ELECTRICITY RESTRUCTURING BACKGROUND: PUBLIC
UTILITY HOLDING COMPANY ACT OF 1935 (PUHCA) (1999), http://ncseonline.
org/NLE/CRSreports/energy/eng-47.cfn. Prior to this legislation, pyramiding of
vast numbers of operating utilities led to large portions of the national private
electric system being held by a small number of holding companies. Id. This
monopolization led to nefarious lending schemes between affiliated businesses,
excessive consumer utility rates, and instability in the overall market. Id. By
1932, some of these pyramids were separated by as many as ten layers and three
of the largest controlled 45% of the electricity generated in the United States. Id.
In the seven year period surrounding the stock market crash, fifty three holding
companies with combined securities of $1.7 billion went into bankruptcy or
receivership. Id. Furthermore, this convoluted system produced large complex
national companies that became virtually impossible for state and local
governments to effectively regulate. Id.
The PUHCA was enacted to benefit both consumers and investors by
eliminating unfair practices and other abuses by electricity and gas holding
companies through federal control and regulation of interstate public utility
holding companies by the SEC and FERC. Id. See also Heather Curlee,
Examining EPACT 2005: A Prospective Look at the Changing Regulatory
Approach of the FERC, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1649, 1651-53 (2006).
Establishing a parallel system of regulations, the 1935 Public Utility Act
contained two titles, which created corresponding tracks of regulation. PUHCA
was the first one which covered the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC). The second title was the Federal Power Act (FPA) and the Federal Power
Commission (now the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission-FERC). Id. at
1650. The SEC was tasked with improving investor protection through greater
regulation of the complex public holding company structure. Id. The FERC was
to protect the ratepayers through regulation of wholesale interstate energy sales.
Id. Holding companies subject to the PUHCA were then required to register
with the SEC and could be no more than twice removed from their controlled
utilities. Id. When the PUHCA was repealed by the Energy Policy Act of 2005,
the FERC became the sole regulatory body over the electric industry and was
given control of much of the SEC's previous oversight duties. Id. at 1651 (citing
Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594). The Energy
Policy Act also allows state and local regulators, to the extent necessary to
discharge their duties, access to books and records of the holding companies. Id.
Thus, even though PUHCA has been repealed, the electric utility industry is still
subject to comprehensive state and federal regulation designed to prevent fraud
and misuse of the corporate form. Id.
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Public Service, Inc.70 In 1989, MSU changed its name to Entergy
Corporation with the subsidiaries subsequently adopting the
Entergy name plus their respective geographic and jurisdictional
identifiers over the next seven years. In 1992, Entergy
Corporation announced its intention to acquire Gulf States
Utilities, Inc., a public utility company operating in southwest
Louisiana and southeast Texas, which became Entergy Gulf South
(EGS). 7
2
In June of 2000, the town of Haynesville brought suit against
ELI and Entergy Corporation, alleging that ELI was in breach of
the most favored nation clause due to 1) ELI's payment of a 3%
franchise fee to the city of West Monroe and 2) EGS' payment of a
5% franchise fee to municipalities in Texas under a single business
enterprise theory. In 2001, the trial court granted Haynesville's
motion for summary judgment on the 3% ELI claim and denied
Entergy Corporation's motion seeking a judgment that ELI was not
liable under the 5% SBE claim.74 Entergy appealed.75
In 2003, the second circuit affirmed both the trial court's grant
of summary judgment in favor of Haynesville on the 3% claim76
and its denial of Entergy Corporation's motion that Haynesville
was not entitled to recover the 5% claim under SBE theory.77 In
denying Entergy's motion, the second circuit relied on the
following evidence: although EGS was not acquired by Entergy
Corporation until some eight years after the contract was signed,
Entergy Corporation owned 100% of the stock of ELI and EGS
and the two entities shared common offices and directors. 7
Furthermore, the two entities shared the same service company,
Entergy Services, which made payments on behalf of the two
subsidiaries to various municipalities.79 Finally, the court took
notice of a newspaper advertisement that ran in 1996, some eleven
years after the contract was signed, noting the new name of LP&L
and stating that Entergy had unified "five separate power
companies into one cohesive whole.,
80
70. Haynesville 1H, 956 So. 2d at 194.
71. Id. at 194-95.
72. Id.
73. Town of Haynesville, Inc. v. Entergy Corp. (Haynesville 1), 840 So. 2d
597, 598-600 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 845 So. 2d 1090 (La. 2003).
74. Id. at 600-02.
75. Id. at 602.
76. Haynesville 11, 956 So. 2d at 195. As the 3% claim was not at issue in
the later 2007 appeal, it will not be addressed by this Case Note. Id.
77. Haynesville I, 840 So. 2d at 607.
78. Id. at 606.
79. Id,
80. Id.
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The court followed its review of the evidence by briefly
discussing SBE theory as introduced by the first circuit in Green
and then listed the eighteen factor test. Nowhere in its discussion
did it mention fraud or misuse of the corporate form as
prerequisites for disregarding the corporate form. The court
specifically found that:
Neither Haynesville nor the defendants presented authority
for liability under the "single business theory" under the
facts of this case. Nor did ELI/Entergy establish that it was
legally entitled to summary judgment denying Haynesville
relief under the "single business entity" hypothesis. We
agree with the trial court's conclusion that there are
genuine issues of material fact as to whether Entergy
operated as a "single business entity." The trial court
properly denied ELllEntergy's request for summary
judgment on this issue. 82
Thus, the only plausible reason for the court to have found that
Entergy had not established that it was legally entitled to judgment
was to base the SBE inquiry solely on a finding of control.
In 2005, the trial court ruled on the merits of Haynesville's
SBE claim and found that the most favored nation agreement was
ambiguous and that Entergy Corporation was a single business
enterprise.83 After Entergy's subsequent motion for a new trial was
denied, a second appeal ensued.84
B. The Second Circuit's Decision on Appeal
The second circuit's refusal to uphold the trial court's
decision-to, in effect, use SBE to judicially re-write the
contract-can only be described as a judicial step back from the
brink of disaster. In so ruling, the court retreated from its analysis
in the earlier appeal and made clear that it would not allow the
application of SBE theory to re-interpret the provisions of a
contract.8 5 After finding that the trial court erred in determining
that the contract was ambiguous, the second circuit then properly
analyzed the application of SBE theory to Entergy Corporation
using standards similar to those employed in traditional veil-
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Town of Haynesville, Inc. v. Entergy Corp. (Haynesville If), 956 So. 2d
192, 195 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 964 So. 2d 334 (La. 2007).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 197.
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piercing cases.86  Although the second circuit should be
commended for its departure from its previous analysis by refusing
to expand SBE theory into the realm of contract interpretation, it
failed to explicitly state the underlying principle of its holding. The
court should have made clear that absent any showing of fraud or
misuse of the corporate form, SBE theory should not be used to
disregard the bedrock principle of Louisiana business law
respecting corporate separateness and its intrinsic protection of
limited liability. Even without such an explicit statement, it is
arguable that the second circuit's opinion in Haynesville provides a
much needed judicial precedent rejecting SBE theory in general
and its reliance on the mere fact of control to trigger group
liability.
1. Contract Interpretation and the Civil Code
The second circuit began its two step analysis of the trial
court's decision by first discussing the relevant Civil Code articles
on contract interpretation. Namely, "[t]he interpretation of a
contract is the determination of the common intent of parties with
the courts giving the contractual words their generally prevailiny
meaning unless the words have acquired a technical meaning."
"A doubtful provision must be interpreted in light of, inter alia, the
conduct of the parties before and after the formation of the
contract., 88 And when the words of a contract are clear and
unambiguous, they should be enforced as written.
89
Applying these principles to the facts of the case, the court
overturned the trial court's finding that the most favored nation
agreement was ambiguous. Specifically, the court found that:
The trial court erred in its determination that the [most
favored nation] clause is ambiguous in that "it does not
provide for what is intended in the event the obligor,
[LP&L], changes ownership, changes names, or through the
actions of a parent or affiliated company, pays a franchise
fee of greater than 2% to some other municipality."
90
The court gave three reasons for this decision.9' First, "a
change in the name of a corporation has no effect on the rights and
86. Id. at 196-98.
87. Id at 195 (citing LA. CrV. CODE arts. 2045, 2047 (2007); other citations
omitted).
88. Id (citing LA. CiV. CODE art. 2053).
89. Id (citing LA. CIV. CODE art. 2046).
90. Id. at 195-96.
91. Id at 196.
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obligations of the parties to an agreement." 92 Second, ELI did not
change ownership when its parent company changed its name from
GSU to Entergy Corporation.93 Third, the agreement explicitly
required LP&L to pay a higher franchise fee to trigger additional
obligations and Haynesville offered no proof that a parent or other
affiliate paid a higher fee on behalf of LP&L.94 In this last reason,
the court seemed to be foreshadowing its SBE analysis by
suggesting that there had been no breach of any contractually
implied duty of good faith.
2. Entergy Is Not an SBE
Moving to the second step of its analysis, the second circuit
reviewed the trial court's determination that Entergy Corporation
was a single business enterprise. Citing Green, the second circuit
began in a similar fashion to its previous opinion by restating the
eighteen factor test established by the first circuit. The court found
that the trial court's determination of Entergy Corporation to be an
SBE relied on the presence of four factors.95 First, ELI was a
wholly owned subsidiary of Entergy Corporation and thus had de
facto working control over its subsidiary.96 Second, ELI, Entergy
Corporation, and its other subsidiaries share common directors
and/or officers.97 Third, Entergy Corporation published an
advertisement in 1996 stating that Entergy was unifying five
separate power companies into a cohesive whole.98 And lastly,
franchise fee payments were made on behalf of ELI to Haynesville
by Entergy Services, Inc. (ESI), who also acted as agent for a
number of other Entergy affiliates. 99 In a departure from its
previous opinion, the second circuit then rejected each of these
factors as grounds for piercing the corporate veil.
The second circuit began this reversal with arguably the most
important statement in the opinion: "control alone is not sufficient
to warrant a piercing of the corporate veil."' 00 With this one
statement, the court was effectively subjecting SBE cases to the
same standards that apply in traditional veil-piercing cases and
thus undercut the application of SBE theory without a showing of
92. Id. (citation omitted).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 197.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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fraud or misuse of the corporate form. This statement also provides
a basis for arguing that the jurisprudential scope of the opinion
extends beyond the contractual interpretation arena and directly
challenges SBE theory itself. Continuing on this theme, the court
stated that "[the involvement of a sole or majority shareholder in a
corporation is not sufficient alone to establish a basis for
disregarding the corporate entity"'01and that "in Louisiana the
concept of the separation of the corporate entity from those who
compose it is the general rule and is firmly established."' 0 2 By
rejecting the first two factors relied upon by the trial court, the
second circuit found that mere control and overlap of employees
are insufficient to warrant piercing of the corporate veil. °3 The
court then, in a very interesting tailoring of its analysis to the
particular defendant at hand, suggested that because Entergy's
corporate structure and activities are regulated under the federal
PUHCA, there might have been a federal preemption concern.10 4
The court then made quick work of the trial court's reliance on
the newspaper advertisement as evidence that Entergy is an SBE.
Noting that the ad was run in 1996, eleven years after the contract
was formed, the court stated that "[tihe semantics of a commercial
advertisement cannot be construed to alter an unambiguous
agreement between Entergy and Haynesville."
10 5
By engaging in a hybrid of contract interpretation and
traditional veil-piercing analysis, the second circuit found
numerous errors in the trial court's reliance on LP&L changing its
name to ELI and ESI acting as the common agent for the affiliated
companies. 0 6 First, the court held that sharing a common agent or
having a centralized accounting system simply did not make the
contract ambiguous. Furthermore, because these events didn't even
occur until more than ten years after the parties signed the
agreement, "subsequent changes, not contemplated by the parties
at the time of the apeement cannot be considered to render the
contract ambiguous." ,07 Finally, the court noted that there was no
evidence that the intent of the parties was to include the actions of
any other entity besides ELI, l°5nor was there an allegation that the
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. The interesting question of whether SBE theory should ever be
applied to a federally-regulated industry is one that is left open by this Note.
105. Id. at 197.
106. Haynesville 11, 956 So. 2d at 198.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 195 ("Despite the fact that in January 1985, LP&L had a parent
corporation and subsidiary corporations, no words are used to expand the
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structure of Entergy Corporation was formed with the intent to
defraud Haynesville. 10 9 Because "Louisiana law is well established
that corporate separateness is to be recognized and respected[,]"
piercing the corporate veil should be "considered a radical remedy
only employed in exceptional circumstances."'1 10 Thus, without any
evidence of fraud, the only way Haynesville could succeed in
piercing the corporate veil was by showing that Enter Ry
Corporation and its subsidiaries were "alter egos" of each other.
This approach is much closer to a traditional veil-piercing analysis
than SBE.
Applying the five-factor test used in traditional veil-piercing
cases, 1 the court found that none of the factors were satisfied by
the evidence in the record.' 13 Further blending SBE theory and
traditional veil-piercing analysis, the court stated, "[t]here is
simply no wrongdoing or other extraordinary circumstances
present in the relationship between Haynesville and LP&L that
justifies disregarding the law of persons and . . . Louisiana
corporations." 4 Contradicting its previous opinion, the court
asserted that the terms of most favored nation agreements are not
affected by SBE theory and that use of SBE theory to interpret the
agreement is improper. 15
Reading both of the second circuit's opinions together, it is
apparent that the court has reversed its analysis. The court's
opinion on summary judgment effectively approved the application
of SBE theory to a contractual interpretation setting and casts the
issue as a question of fact as opposed to a question of law. This
appears contrary to the court's opinion on the merits where the
analysis indicated a question of law. First, if control alone does not
warrant the piercing of the corporate veil, then Haynesville's
failure to even allege fraud or misuse of the corporate form should
have been fatal to its claim. 116 Second, the court intimated that a
corporate structure formed under the rubric of a federal statutory
scheme (PUHCA) could not be found to be an SBE without
triggering event beyond LP&L's contracting with another town or municipality
in the renewal of LP&L's franchise fee.").
109. Id. at 198.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See MORRIs & HOLMES, supra note 9, § 32.02, at 56.
113. Haynesville I, 956 So. 2dat 198-99.
114. Id. at 199.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 197.
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producing a serious preemption concern. 117 Finally, the court's
statement that the use of SBE theory for the purpose of interpreting
the agreement between the two parties is improper effectively
precludes its application as a valid theory of law in this case.is
Ultimately, the second circuit's reversal of the trial court's
decision on the merits brought a welcome measure of sanity to the
application of SBE theory in Louisiana. It attempts to halt what has
been described as the first circuit's "'Sherman's March' through
Louisiana's piercing-the-corporate-veil jurisprudence." ' 119 Although
the court only expressly held that the use of SBE theory to interpret
a provision in a contract is improper, other language in the opinion
seems to suggest a far broader conclusion. The court plainly stated
that the mere factor of control is not enough to disregard corporate
separateness and applied the requirements of fraud or misuse of the
corporate form found in traditional veil-piercing jurisprudence to
an SBE analysis. If SBE theory and its eighteen factor test allow
the mere control of one company by another to trigger liability,
then the jurisprudential scope of the second circuit's opinion in
Haynesville goes beyond the realm of contractual interpretation
and directly challenges SBE theory itself. Though the second
circuit deserves high praise for this challenge, it is regrettable that
the court did not further explain its reasoning. SBE jurisprudence
and Louisiana business interests would have greatly benefitted
from a more in-depth judicial statement on the policy reasons
behind the necessity of holding SBE theory to the same high
standards of traditional veil-piercing. Still, Haynesville provides an
important first step in the rejection of SBE theory and its reliance
on the mere factor of control to trigger group liability. As the
Supreme Court of Louisiana has declined to grant writs in this
matter, this author hopes that other circuits in Louisiana will
follow the second circuit's logic in Haynesville and refuse to apply
SBE theory in the absence of a showing of fraud or misuse of the
corporate form.
IV. CONCLUSION
It has been noted by other commentators that "Louisiana is a
capital-poor state that grounds its hopes of business and economic
development on the strategy of attracting outside capital to invest
117. Id. at 197-98 ("To find that the commonality of personnel or
centralization of certain aspects of control constitute a single business enterprise
in the context of a public utility would undermine the PUHCA.").
118. Id. at 199.
119. Posin, supra note 19, at 357.
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in this state."' 120 The broad application of SBE theory to undermine
the principle of granting limited liability to corporations and LLCs
could prove damaging to this strategy and the future of our state's
economy. Post-Katrina Louisiana can ill afford to discourage
business investment through unsound and unpredictable business
laws. Therefore, Louisiana courts should make it clear that absent
fraud or misuse of the corporate form, they will consistently
respect the legitimate use of the multiple entity corporate form and
its inherent limited liability protection.
James Dunne*
120. Posin, supra note 19, at 364.
* The author would like to thank Professor Glenn G. Morris, Professor
Wendell H. Holmes, and Denise C. Redmann for their guidance and assistance
throughout the drafting process.
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